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DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040405T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040405T000000
DTSTAMP:20201006T231357Z
CREATED:20200922T213539Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T231357Z
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SUMMARY:Lynn Stout - Other-Regarding Behavior and the Law
DESCRIPTION:Lynn Stout: UCLA School of LawLegal scholars have become keenly interested in behavioral approaches to lawthat recognize that real people do not always behave in a selfishly rational fashion: numerous recent papers examine how human choice can be distorted by endowment effects\, anchoring effects\, availability biases\, and other cognitive deficiencies. There is a curious imbalance to this “behavioral law and economics” literature\, however. Contemporary critiques of the selfish rationality model of human behavior tend to focus far more on the\nsecond modifier – the assumption of rationality – than on first – the assumption of self interest. \nThis article reverses that emphasis. It argues that the human tendency to act in an other-regarding fashion (to sacrifice in order to help or harm others) is far more pervasive and important than generally recognized. In support of this claim\, it reviews the extensive empirical evidence that has been accumulated over the past five decades on human behavior in experiments known as social dilemma games\, ultimatum games\, and dictator games. These experiments have consistently found that under certain circumstances\, subjects routinely behave as if they care about costs and benefits to others. In the parlance of economics\, they predictably “reveal”\nother-regarding preferences. Moreover\, this other-regarding behavior seems driven primarily by social context – subjects’ perceptions of what others believe\, what others expect\, and how others are likely to behave. \nThese findings are of importance not only to our understanding of individual behavior\, but also to our understanding of a wide variety of social institutions\, including the social institution known as law. To illustrate\, this Article offers a simple model of other-regarding behavior derived from the experimental evidence. It then explores how the model sheds light on three basic areas of legal doctrine: tort\, contract\, and criminal law. As will be seen\, incorporating other-regarding behavior into the analysis offers to explain a number of puzzles in these three areas that cannot be resolved by using the homo economicus model of selfish rationality. It also promotes a better appreciation of the essential role “conscience” may play in ensuring a functioning legal system\, as well as the myriad\, subtle\, and sometimes counterintuitive ways in which state and private actors employ law to change behavior.
URL:https://bec.ucla.edu/event/lynn-stout-other-regarding-behavior-and-the-law/
CATEGORIES:Past Presentation,Presentation
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040412T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040412T000000
DTSTAMP:20201006T231357Z
CREATED:20200922T213540Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T231357Z
UID:3952-1081728000-1081728000@bec.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Nancy K. Dess - Violence and Its Antidotes: Promises and Pitfalls of Evolutionarily Aware Policy Development
DESCRIPTION:Nancy K. Dess: Occidental CollegeGlimpses at our primate relatives and diverse human cultures provide prima facie evidence that as a species\, we are capable of far more benevolent\, just\, and healthful living than exists in many places. Illuminating human nature through evolutionary reasoning has great potential to make public policy more effective and more humane. To fulfill this promise\, historical and political realities that constrain or are conducive to evolutionary reasoning must be appraised. In addition\, five unhelpful habits must be broken: analysis by false dichotomy; anthropodenial; perpetuation of aggression myths; oversimplification; and wishful thinking. Understanding the kind of animal we are may be as helpful to overcoming these obstacles as it will be to the formulation of good policy.
URL:https://bec.ucla.edu/event/nancy-k-dess-violence-and-its-antidotes-promises-and-pitfalls-of-evolutionarily-aware-policy-development/
CATEGORIES:Past Presentation,Presentation
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040419T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040419T000000
DTSTAMP:20201006T231357Z
CREATED:20200922T213542Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T231357Z
UID:3953-1082332800-1082332800@bec.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Stephen Stich - Why Moral Philosophers Need LOTS of Help from Psychologists\, Anthropologists and Other Social Scientists
DESCRIPTION:Stephen Stich: Rutgers Dept. of PhilosophyThe talk has three parts: \nIn Part I\, I will sketch a hotly debated question in moral philosophy. Roughly stated\, the issue in dispute is whether moral disagreement is fundamental or superficial; disagreement is fundamental if it would persist even under “idealized” circumstances in which the parties to the dispute are fully rational\, impartial\, and agreed on all non-moral issues. I’ll then explain why moral many moral philosophers think the answer is of enormous importance. \nIn Part II\, I’ll review two empirical studies that suggest moral disagreement is indeed fundamental. One study\, rarely cited by social scientists\, is Richard Brandt’s philosophically motivated moral ethnography of the Hopi. The other is drawn from the work of Richard Nisbett and his colleagues on cultures of honor. These studies are hardly conclusive\, however\, and even if issues of interpretation are put to one side\, those who do not believe that moral disagreement is fundamental might argue that the examples of moral disagreement on which they focus are outliers\, and that in general moral views will converge under idealized circumstances. To address these concerns\, we need an empirically supported theory of the psychological mechanisms underlying the acquisition & utilization of moral norms and of how those mechanisms might have evolved. \nIn Part III\, I will provide an overview of a collaborative project aimed at developing an empirical theory of the psychology & evolution of moral norms. I will focus on two crucial issues that the theory must address:\n• What sort of psychological mechanisms subserve the acquisition and implementation of norms?\n• What constraints (if any) are there on the sorts of norms that can be acquired?\nThough the existing empirical literature provides some very important clues\, there are many crucial questions for which\, as far as we have been able to discover\, there is little or no relevant data available. My goal\, in this part of the talk\, is to provide a framework which makes clear what we need to know about the psychological mechanisms subserving moral norms. My hope is that some people in the audience will know of relevant findings that have escaped our notice\, or (better still) that they can be tempted to design new studies that will help answer or reconfigure some of the most important and most venerable questions in moral theory.
URL:https://bec.ucla.edu/event/stephen-stich-why-moral-philosophers-need-lots-of-help-from-psychologists-anthropologists-and-other-social-scientists/
CATEGORIES:Past Presentation,Presentation
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040426T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20040426T000000
DTSTAMP:20201006T231357Z
CREATED:20200922T213543Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T231357Z
UID:3954-1082937600-1082937600@bec.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Christine Harris - Did Men and Women Evolve Different Jealousy Mechanisms?
DESCRIPTION:Christine Harris: UC San Diego Dept. of PsychologyThe specific innate modular theory of jealousy (JSIM) hypothesizes that men are innately prone to upset over a mate’s sexual infidelity and women\, over a mate’s emotional infidelity. This view claims that natural selection has shaped sexual jealousy as a mechanism to prevent cuckoldry and emotional jealousy as a mechanism to prevent resource loss. Three lines of evidence have been offered as support: 1) psychophysiological reactions when imagining the two forms of infidelity\, 2) responses to hypothetical scenarios\, and 3) rates of domestic violence and morbid jealousy. This talk will re-examine each line of work and present evidence that questions the extent to which there are robust sex differences. An alternative theory of jealousy will be discussed which proposes a more domain general mechanism that may show little sexual dimorphism.http://www.bec.ucla.edu/papers/Harris_4-26-04.pdf
URL:https://bec.ucla.edu/event/christine-harris-did-men-and-women-evolve-different-jealousy-mechanisms/
CATEGORIES:Past Presentation,Presentation
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